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ARTICLES 
"THIRTY PIECES OF SILVER" FOR THE 
RIGHTS OF YOUR PEOPLE: 
IRRESISTIBLE OFFERS 
RECONSIDERED AS A MATTER 
OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE* 
I. 
In recent decades there has arisen a renewed interest in state 
constitutional law provisions that parallel the provisions in the 
Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. Most typically 
this interest has been pressed by parties who have discovered 
the usefulness of state bills of rights that may be more protec-
tive than the equivalent provisions in the federal Constitu-
tion-provisions on which they would otherwise be forced, 
unsuccessfully, to rely. 
Examples of this renewed interest abound in many areas of 
law. In criminal procedure, for example, search and seizure 
practices found not to offend the Fourteenth Amendment's in-
corporation of the Fourth Amendment search and seizure pro-
vision have nevertheless been successfully impugned pursuant 
to some state constitutional clauses. 1 Under its recently ex-
panded "open fields" exception, the Supreme Court may not 
regard deliberate searches by police acting without warrants to 
be barred by the Fourth Amendment; but a state court may not 
regard the matter similarly when applying the relevant state 
constitutional provision to the same case. 2 So, too, state and 
* William R. and Thomas C. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University School of 
Law. 
I. Compare Nelson v. Lane, 743 P.2d 692 (Or. 1986)(holding that sobriety roadblock 
to obtain evidence for criminal prosecution, absent warrant or probable cause, violates 
state constitution as illegal seizure) with Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Stitz, 110 S. 
Ct. 2481 (1990)(sustaining such procedures against Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment objections). 
2. See State v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992)(applying art. I, § 12 of the New 
York Constitution to protect private lands, clearly fenced and posted against trespass-
ers, against searches despite the Supreme Court view in Oliver v. United States, 466 
U.S. 170 (1984), that neither the Fourth nor Fourteenth Amendment affords such pro-
tection under the "open fields" doctrine). The 4-3 majority in Scott notes that the texts 
of the state provision and the comparable federal constitutional provision differ. /d. at 
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local laws deemed not to offend the First Amendment have 
been found invalid in a number of states simply because these 
states have stronger constitutional clauses protecting freedom 
ofspeech3 and freedom of the press.4 And some state constitu-
tional church and state separation clauses are also framed more 
sweepingly than the equivalent clause in the First Amend-
ment.5 It is not surprising that certain state forms of assistance 
to religion not deemed unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment by a majority ofthe U.S. Supreme Court are none-
theless disallowed under more broadly worded parallel provi-
1335. So, too, in a concurring opinion, Justice (now Chief justice) Kaye suggests it is 
appropriate to rely on stronger state constitutional interpretations when the U.S. 
Supreme Court appears to have curtailed the scope of the corresponding federal con-
stitutional provision. /d. at 1347. ("[W]here we conclude that the Supreme Court has 
changed course and diluted constitutional principles, I cannot agree that we act im-
properly in discharging our responsibility to support the State Constitution [by abiding 
with a stronger view]."). See also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 
(1988)(White,J., concurring)("lndividual States may surely construe their own consti-
tutions as imposing more stringent constraints on police conduct than does the Federal 
Constitution.") 
3. See City of Portland v. Tidyman, 759 P.2d 242 (Or. 1988)(invalidating an "adult 
book store" zoning ordinance under the state constitutional free speech clause, even 
though the ordinance was permissible under the First and Fourteenth Amendments): 
Wheeler v. Green, 593 P.2d 777, 789 (Or. 1979)(construing the Oregon free speech 
clause to disallow punitive damages in libel cases, even when the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments would not bar such an award); see also Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, 
Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161 (Mass. 1975)(precluding punitive damages in libel actions in Mas-
sachusetts); cf Dun and Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 
(1985). 
4. Compare Westside SANE/Freeze v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 274 Cal. Rptr. 51 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1990)(applying CAL. CoNST. art. I, §§ 2-3 on free speech, assembly, and peti-
tion signing by third parties inside privately-owned mall) with Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 
U.S. 507 (1976)(holding that neither the First nor the Fourteenth Amendments secures 
a right to leaflet or seek petition signatures on corporate shopping mall premises). For 
references to cases in other states, see Gerald E. Weis, Stepping into the Breach: Stale 
Constitutional Protection of Expressive Rights in Private Owned Commercial Establishments, 4 
EMERGING IssuEs IN ST. CoNST. L. 159 (1991). 
5. A number of these state constitutional clauses are modeled on the ill-fated Blaine 
Amendment, H.R. 1, 44th Gong., 1st Sess. (1875), proposed by President Grant in 
1875 and introduced in Congress by Representative james Blaine. It passed the House 
by a vote of 180 to 7, but failed to receive the requisite two-thirds approval in the 
Senate. The Blaine Amendment copied the language of the First Amendment's religion 
clauses verbatim, but added substantial language: 
No state shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohib· 
iting the free exercise thereof; and, no money raised by taxation for the sup-
port of public schools, or derived from any public fund therefore, nor any 
public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious 
sect, nor shall any money so raised or lands so devoted be divided between 
religious sects or denominations. 
See RoDNEY K. SMITH, Pusuc PRAYER AND THE CoNSTITUTION 163-69, 261-65 (1987): 
Alfred W. Meyer, Comment, The Blaine Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 64 HARV. L. REV. 
939 (1951). 
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sions in state constitutions.6 
In any event, as these illustrations demonstrate, there is 
good reason for the renewed interest in the independent effi-
cacy of state constitutional law as a set of restrictions on what 
state and local government may presume to do. The matter is 
being increasingly noticed. 7 Certain Supreme Court justices 
(most notably Justice Brennan8) have expressly urged lawy.ers 
and state judges to take a greater interest in this subject to off-
set what they regard as a retrograde tendency in the Supreme 
Court's majority decisions.9 Moreover, Hans Linde of the Ore-
6. See, e.g., Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1959)(invalidating school bus 
transportation to parochial schools under the broader nonestablishment provision in 
the Alaska Constitution, notwithstanding the U.S. Supreme Court's upholding of such 
transportation when challenged under the First Amendment in Everson v. Board of 
Education, 330 U.S. I (1947)); id. at 943 ("[W]e propose to follow the reasoning of the 
Courts of Washington, Missouri, Delaware, Wisconsin and Oklahoma and hold that 
transportation of school children to nonpublic schools at public expense would be in 
contravention of our state constitution."). 
For a different kind of example, compare Murphy v. Bilbray, 782 F. Supp. 1420 (S.D. 
Cal. 199l)(relying on the clearer "no preference" language in art. I, § 4 of the Califor-
nia Constitution to uphold a challenge to the use of a Latin cross in a city insignia-as 
well as in public buildings or parks-without reference to whether the challenge would 
succeed if examined under the First and Fourteenth Amendments) with County of Alle-
gheny v. A.C.L.U., 492 U.S. 573 (1989) and Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
For additional cases and references, see CHESTERj. ANTIEAU ET AL., RELIGION UNDER 
THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1965). 
7. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Constitutional Law Conference, 61 U.S.L.W. 2237, 2244 (Oct. 
27, 1992)("Turning his attention away from the past Supreme Court term, [University 
of Michigan Law Professor Yale] Kamisar said he has been struck in recent years with 
the number of state appellate courts that have invoked their own constitutions to grant 
criminal defendants more rights than they enjoy under the federal Constitution."). 
8. See William J. Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitu-
tions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535 (1986); WilliamJ. Brennan, 
State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977). 
9. Without doubt, part of the new fashionability of state constitutional law is driven 
principally by ideological interests identified to Warren Court-era decisions, decisions 
that successor justices on the Court have had doubts about (and assuredly have been 
unwilling to extend even further). The vast majority of state constitutional decisions 
within the past fifteen years reflect this bias. As a result, many of these decisions exhibit 
more social zeal than professional craft, confirming Professor Maltz's justified criticism 
of how state constitutional analysis tends to get used in actual practice. See Earl M. 
Maltz, The Political Dynamic of the "New judicial Federalism," 2 EMERGING IssuEs IN ST. 
CoNST. L. 233 (1989)[hereinafter Maltz, Political Dynamic]; see also Earl M. Maltz, False 
Prophet-justice Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional Law, 15 HASTINGS CoNsT. 
L.Q, 429 (1988)[hereinafter Maltz, False Prophet]. Still, that much being allowed for, it is 
yet worth observing that there is nothing in the nature of state constitutional law that 
requires any such bias. Some state supreme courts work at the task with greater detach-
ment. For example, state constitutional clauses on economic liberty are sometimes also 
taken seriously, even though the corresponding clauses in the federal Constitution 
tend not to receive their due at all. See, e.g., Lincoln Dairy Co. v. Finigan, 104 N.W.2d 
227, 233-34 (Neb. 1960)(striking down a state law restricting competition for no dis-
cernible public good); see also James C. Kirby, Expansive judicial Review of Economic Regu-
lation under State Constitutions, 48 TENN. L. REv. 241 (1981); Developments in the Law-The 
Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1324, 1463-93 (1982). The 
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gon Supreme Court wrote persuasively more than a decade ago 
in a series of law review articles and judicial opinions that state 
judges have a duty to require counsel to brief and present state 
constitutional questions (indeed, that they must do so, prior to 
raising any federal claim in the same case). 10 
But by now, of course, all of the preceding summary review is 
quite familiar stuff. It has been addressed in law review articles 
a great deal during the last fifteen years, beginning most nota-
bly with A.E. Dick Howard. 11 And the topic I think may be 
newly interesting, because not so well-explored, is not this topic 
as such, interesting and important as this topic has been and 
Supreme Court's virtual abdication in this large area was ably reviewed thirty years ago 
in Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and The Supreme Court: An Exhumation and 
Reburial, I962 SuP. CT. REV. 34. See also FRANK R. STRONG, SUBSTANTIVE DuE PROCESS: 
SENSE AND NONSENSE (1986). 
10. Judge Linde's position is that one cannot sensibly object to state practices on 
Fourteenth Amendment grounds until a state court has first determined that the prac-
tices do not violate the state's own constitution. If the objected-to practice is forbidden 
by state constitutional law and state law provides ample relief, then it cannot be said 
that "the state" is acting to violate the litigant's Fourteeenth Amendment rights. Thus, 
the state court must first address state constitutional grounds for relief, and only in the 
event that state law contains no effective relief does it become appropriate to examine 
whether the Fourteenth Amendment may apply. See Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-Coi!StitU· 
tional Theory and State Courts, I8 GA. L. REV. I65, I78 (I984); Hans A. Linde, First Things 
First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379 (I980); Hans A. Linde, 
Without "Due Process"-Uncoi!Stitutional Law in Oregon, 49 Or. L. Rev. I25 (I970); Hans A. 
Linde, Book Review, 52 OR. L. REV. 325 (I973). 
In Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d I2I3 (I98I), judge Linde explained: "The proper 
sequence is to analyze the state's law, including its constitutional law, before reaching a 
federal constitutional claim. This is required, not for the sake either of parochialism or 
of style, but because the state does not deny any right claimed under the federal Con-
stitution when the claim before the court in fact is fully met by state law." !d. at 1216; 
see also Salem College & Academy, Inc. v. Employment Div., 695 P.2d 25, 34 (Or. 1985). 
For judge Linde's most recent reflections on ways of treating state constitutional law, 
see Hans A. Linde, Are State Coi!Stitutioi!S Common Law?, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 215 (1992). 
1I. See A.E. Dick Howard, The Renaissance of State Coi!Stitutional Law, 1 EMERGING Is-
SUES IN ST. CoNsT. L. I (1988); A.E. Dick Howard, The States and the Supreme Court, 31 
CATH. U. L. REv. 375 (1982); A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Coi!Stitutional Rights in 
the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873 (1976); see also Shirley S. Abrahamson, 
Criminal Law and State Coi!Stitutioi!S: The Emergence of State Coi!Stitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. 
REv. II4I (1985); Ronald K. Collins, Reliance on State Coi!Stitutioi!S-Awayfrom a Reaction-
ary Approach, 9 HASTINGS CoNST. L.Q, I (I981); Peter J. Galie, Modes of Comtitutional 
Interpretation: The New York Court of Appeals Search for a Role, 4 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. 
CoN sT. L. 225; Peter J. Galie, State Coi!Stitutional Guarantees and Protection of Defendants' 
Rights: The Case of New York, 1960-1978, 28 BuFF. L. REv. 157 (1979). But see James A. 
Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Coi!Stitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761 (1992); 
Maltz, False Prophet, supra note 9, at 429; Maltz, Political Dynamic, supra note 9, at 233 
(arguing that while in theory state court activism need not have a political bias, in de-
sign and practice the so-called "new federalism" is often a device for advancing the 
liberal political agenda); Steven J. Twist & Mark E. Hessinger, .\'ew judicial Federalism: 
Where Law Ends and Tyranny Begii!S, 3 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 174 ( 1990); 
Steven J. Twist & Len L. Munsil, The Double Threat of judicial Activism: 1nventing New 
"Rights" in State Coi!Stitutioi!S, 2I ARIZ. L. REV. I005 (1989). 
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still is. 12 Rather, it is another-but one crucially tied to this 
topic along a different axis of federalism. I will argue that state 
and local governments may not accept federal funds when, 
were they to do so, they would at once put at risk such rights as 
they are forbidden by state constitutional law to abridge. The 
implications of this suggestion-as a hedge against tendencies 
in Congress and the ways it tends to do business to secure a 
flattening out of differences among states that take a different 
view of "rights" than Congress wants them to take-are signifi-
cant. At least I believe this may be so, if the following thoughts 
are right. 
II 
Valid acts of Congress supersede any contrary state laws and 
any state constitutional provisions. They do so by the express 
terms of the Supremacy Clause in Article VI of the U.S. Consti-
tution. 13 As to all such ordinary acts of Congress, it is a matter 
of no consequence that they may affect private rights the state 
itself could not affect in the same way because forbidden to do 
so pursuant to some restriction the state constitution imposes 
upon the state. And nothing in this brief article means to raise 
12. See Hans A. Linde, Does the "New Federalism" Have a Future?, 4 EMERGING IssuEs IN 
ST. CoNST. L. 251, 251 (1991)("Commentators have counted more than 500 ... deci-
sions [ruling in favor of individual rights claims under a state constitution rather than 
the U.S. Constitution] in the past dozen years ... . ");see also Linda Matarese, Other 
Voices: The Role of justices Durham, Kaye, and Abrahamson in Shaping The "New judicial Feder-
alism", 2 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 239, 246 (1989)("[B)etween 1970 and 
1989, state courts handed down almost 600 decisions in which they relied on their state 
constitutions to provide individual rights protections now lacking under the federal 
Constitution."). The continued submission of certiorari petitions from state court rul-
ings that contained mixed references to state constitution clauses and the Fourteenth 
Amendment undoubtedly was a major factor behind the Supreme Court's decision to 
clarify these matters with the standards announced in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 
(1983). If there could still be any doubt about the pertinence of considering separate, 
state constitutional law grounds to be researched and argued alternatively or addition-
ally to Fourteenth Amendment constitutional objections, such doubts have been dis-
pelled in the past year. The first commercial looseleaf encyclopedic treatise devoted 
solely to this subject, canvassing all fifty states, has now been published. It is certain to 
sell very well. See Ronald K. Collins, The New Federalism, 78 A.B.A.]. 92 (1992) (review-
ing jENNIFER FREISEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: LmGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, 
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES (1992)}("The attorney who fails to investigate and raise available 
state claims is probably skating close to the edge of malpractice."). 
13. U.S. CoNST. art. VI,§ 2. ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; 
and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."). 
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any question challenging the correctness or sturdiness of these 
truths. 
So, for example, if Congress, pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause, 14 presumes to forbid any employment of persons for 
more than a prescribed maximum number of hours per week, it 
is of no consequence that a state constitution's "substantive 
due process" or "freedom of contract" clause might have been 
construed by a state supreme court to invalidate an act of the 
state legislature similarly restricting the cc;mtractualliberties of 
employees and employers in that state. 15 Such state constitu-
tional clauses may limit what the state may do, but obviously 
they are not binding on Congress. Accordingly, Congress may 
override a "liberty" interest in a way that would be impermissi-
ble if done by an equivalent state statute. Assuming only that 
the act of Congress does not contravene anything in the Bill of 
Rights, it will set the terms controlling the rights and liabilities 
of those to whom it applies directly as a matter of national 
law. 16 All of this is perfectly well-settled pursuant to the 
Supremacy Clause itself. 
But while all this is true, there are many acts of Congress 
(probably the greater number) that do not operate in this fash-
ion, that is, they do not operate by enacting some uniform, na-
tionwide rule at once binding across state lines, irrespective of 
state law. Rather, Congress will sometimes offer a carrot to 
each state merely by inviting each state or local government to 
apply for certain federally controlled funds, with strings at-
tached. These congressional acts rely on the wider power of 
Congress to "spend" instead of its power to "regulate." Under 
formal conceptions, each state is entirely free to decide 
whether or not to apply for the federal funds and subsequently 
submit to the federally-prescribed standards that are at-
tached.17 If the state "decides" not to enroll in the program, 
14. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
15. E.g., a state supreme court interpreting and applying a state constitutional due 
process clause more in keeping with the manner of Lochner v. Ne:w York, 198 U.S. 45 
(1905)(holding that a state law restricting the number of hours one may agree to per-
mit another to work in an ordinary business unreasonably interferes with personal con-
tractual liberty and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
16. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); United 
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
17. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480-83 (1923)("[T]he statute 
imposes no obligation but simply extends an option which the State is free to accept or 
reject .... [N]othing is to be done without [the state's] consent."); see also Steward 
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
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the law of the state will remain unchanged. 18 
Beginning in the 1930s as a result of its frustration over the 
U.S. Supreme Court's narrowing interpretation of the congres-
sional commerce power, in countless cases Congress turned to 
its spending power to enforce its will on the states. 19 A modem 
example is furnished by the provision of federal law that any 
state or local school receiving funds under a grant from the 
U.S. Department of Education must, in order to maintain its 
eligibility, continue to make special accommodation and ex-
penditures for handicapped students.20 The school must take 
the "bitter" (of assuming the costs of making such special ac-
commodation) only if it also wants the "sweet" (the federal 
grant). If the state board of education or state legislature feels 
that the costs of meeting the new burdens imposed on it (if it 
18. "Decides" is put in quotations, however, in recognition that in fact Congress 
doesn't want any state to decline-and nearly always takes due care to make refusal of 
participation very costly (usually so costly it need not fear a state will act on its power to 
refuse). The classic illustration of this principle is Steward Machine, 30 I U.S. at 548; see 
also Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2367 (1990)(noting that while "the 
[federal] Act applies only to public secondary schools that receive federal financial 
assistance," and thus "a school district seeking to escape the statute's obligations could 
simply forgo federal funding," the Court did "not doubt that in some cases this may be 
an unrealistic option"); Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947); Sa-
lem College & Academy, Inc. v. Employment Div., 695 P.2d 25, 29 (Or. 1985)("[T]he 
chosen device was a federal payroll tax on employers, 90 percent of which could be 
offset by any payments a state might exact for a state unemployment compensation 
program that met prescribed federal standards .... [C]onstitutionally, compliance 
[was] voluntary on the part of the state, though not practically or politically so."). 
For several well-taken criticisms of the Supreme Court's uncritical standards of fed-
eralism review of Congressional spending-with-strings-attached, see Lewis B. Kaden, 
Politics, Money and State Sovereignty: The judicial Role, 79 CoLUM. L. REv. 847 (1979); Hans 
A. Linde, justice Douglas on Freedom in the Welfare State, 39 WASH. L. REv. 4 (1964); 
Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism s Trojan Horse, 
1988 SuPREME CT. REv. 85. See also Lino A. Graglia, From Federal Union to National Mono-
lith: Mileposts in the Demise of American Federalism, 16 HARv.J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 129, 130-31 
(1993)("The Sixteenth Amendment, establishing the income tax, effectively gave the 
national government unlimited control of the nation's wealth and, consequently, a vir-
tually unlimited spending power .... By extracting money from the now-defenseless 
states and offering to return it with strings attached, the national government is able to 
control by promises of reward-some would say bribery-whatever it might be unable 
or unwilling to control by threat of punishment."). 
19. See supra notes 17-18. 
20. For example, in Christopher T. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 553 F. 
Supp. 1107 (N.D. Cal. 1992) the trial court ruled that states receiving federal grants-in-
aid under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 e/ seq. 
(1988), must provide all handicapped children a suitable, free, public education and 
that pursuant to implementing federal regulations, a local school district may have to 
bear the entire cost of room, board, care, and other expenses for disturbed children 
that could not be put in regular schools, but could only be educated in an institutional-
residential setting. The effect of the law was that the seemingly modest obligation to 
provide a "suitable education" became, in fact, an obligation to provide the total costs 
for the total care of each handicapped child. 
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seeks aid from the Department of Education) are, in its view, 
greater than the net benefit it would realize by receiving funds 
from the federal government, it can save itself the costs of 
those burdens simply by abstaining from participating in the 
federal program. Or so, at least, the general theory holds. 
And the theory is sound at least to the extent that it is assur-
edly true that nothing in the act of Congress itself presumes to 
force any state to apply for such aid. We may assume for now 
that if it were not participating in the federal program, the 
mere failure of a local school to make special provision for 
some kinds of handicapped students would not be deemed to 
violate any right of those students, either under the Fourteenth 
Amendment or under any state statutory or state constitutional 
clause. Rather, the whole idea of the Act of Congress is to cre-
ate private rights21 against the state when Congress is other-
wise doubtful of its power to do so directly or otherwise meets 
too much opposition when it tries to do so directly. It does so 
indirectly, by nominally respecting "federalism," but by using 
the spending power-with-strings-attached instead. But note, 
again, that of course the federal statute does not compel any 
state agency to apply for the funds in the first instance (rather, 
Congress relies on the practical inability of states and of local 
governments to withhold their participation in the federal 
spending program). Only if the state agency or state legislature 
opts for participation, does the provision attached to the fed-
eral program govern under the Supremacy Clause of Article 
VI. 
Consider another example. Suppose that in state X the law of 
criminal procedure22 forbids the state courts to admit any evi-
21. One would think that, absent an express Congressional provision creating a pri· 
vate right, a failure by the state or other recipient to comply with the federal conditions 
tied to the assistance it receives would merely mean that the federal assistance would 
be subject to termination (with or without restitution of prior monies received during 
such times as the conditions were not being observed). Counterintuitively, however, 
this turns out not to be the case. Increasingly, even absent any provision made by Con· 
gress, courts have allowed private causes of action to be brought against the state de-
fendant (or other recipient, for example, a private university), both for injunctive relief 
and also for full tort-like money damages as well. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub-
lic Schools, 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 
(1979)(holding that a damages remedy is available in an implied private action brought 
to enforce Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1988)). 
So, a recipient's "acceptance" of federal program assistance may impose obligations 
and expenses of a considerably greater magnitude than the recipient either supposed 
(or had reason to suppose) when weighing the decision to apply. 
22. For the moment, we need not say whether "the law of criminal procedure" re· 
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dence "obtained by means of police trickery or deceit."23 Con-
gress, however, believes that the realities of fighting crime 
make it imperative that police and prosecutors can bring seri-
ous felons to justice without such niceties as avoiding all trick-
ery and deceit. To be sure, the act of Congress does not 
condone any violation of the Fourth Amendment. Rather, it 
"merely" provides for the admission of evidence, consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment whether or not, however, ob-
tained by trickery or deceit. Congress wants thus to fight crime 
more effectively. Moreover, it wants the states to be able to 
fight crime "more effectively" as well. Here, it seeks to do so by 
the additional technique of spending with strings attached. It 
provides that $250 million be appropriated and thereby be 
made available for such states as may seek some share of that 
appropriation to help fund their courts and their law enforce-
ment services by applying for a block grant; it then further pro-
vides that "in any state receiving such funds, all otherwise 
probative and constitutionally admissible evidence is to be 
deemed admissible in state criminal proceedings, any state law 
or provision to the contrary notwithstanding." State X under-
stands the bargain. It applies for and receives funds pursuant 
to this Congressional act. Presumably, just as the state under-
stands, the federal rule locks in. Objections by defense counsel 
to the admissibility of evidence obtained merely by trickery or 
deceit are not now valid. Rather, the prosecutor may invoke 
and rely upon the provision of the federal, not the state, law. 
ferred to is something found merely in the state statutory code, as distinct from some-
thing found in the state constitution bill of rights. Here, it would seem to make no 
difference. Later, I suggest that perhaps it may make a difference after all. 
23. Such a rule may strike many as naive (that is, as unrealistic). Perhaps it is. Assur-
edly the common practice of government is massively to the contrary. Yet, some fairly 
well-regarded judges, including Holmes and Brandeis, have thought that a standard 
not too far different from this one is not naive, rather, it is what one might want after 
thinking the matter through on one's own. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 
471, 485 (1928)(Brandeis,J., dissenting)(dissenting to the Court's decision upholding 
a federal criminal conviction based on evidence secured by wiretapping forbidden by 
state law but the use of which in federal court was nonetheless not deemed by the 
majority to be forbidden by the Fourth Amendment or by any suitable federal rule; 
"Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches 
the whole people by its example. * * * To declare that in the administration of the 
criminal law the end justifies the means [is] a pernicious doctrine [against which] this 
Court should resolutely set its face."); see also id. at 469,470 (Holmes,J., dissenting)("It 
is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that end that all available evi-
dence should be used. It also is desirable that the Government should not itself foster 
and pay for other crimes, when they are the means by which the evidence is to be 
obtained. * * * We have to choose, and for my part. I think it a less evil that some 
criminals should escape than that the Government should play an ignoble part."). 
312 Harvard journal of Law & Public Policy [Vol. 16 
Under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, state law is dis-
placed just as much in this instance as in the preceding case. 
The power of spending-with-strings-attached is also evident 
in an example involving religious interests. Suppose State Y 
provides textbooks free of any charge or fee as a normal inci-
dent of its public school system. It does not, however, provide 
them to nonpublic schools. An Act of Congress provides that 
state school boards applying for and receiving grants from the 
Department of Education are obliged during the period of any 
such grant to provide free textbooks to nonprofit schools 
otherwise accredited by the state, including parochial schools. 
Though state Y has recently applied for such aid, and now cur-
rently receives it, it has taken no steps to comply with the free 
textbook-loan requirement as just described. Understandably 
outraged by this failure on the state's part, parents of students 
enrolled in eligible nonprofit private schools sue in federal 
court, invoking the provision of the federal statute as the 
source of their claim for relief. Whether or not some state law 
might otherwise have forbidden the giving of textbooks 
purchased with state taxes to students enrolled in private 
schools, the plaintiffs nevertheless will likely prevail. 24 Of 
course, the example assumes that the textbook loan arrange-
ment is one that the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-
ment does not itself forbid a state from embarking on if it chose 
to do so, but we correctly assume that is true here. 25 So the 
case does work out as clearly in this instance as in the others we 
have already suggested. Each example ostensibly merely illus-
trates how federal provisions in "spending-subject-to-federal-
conditions" may override state statutory or state constitutional 
provisions of any contrary sort. 
But I now want to return to our earlier point-on state con-
stitutional provisions and their independent usefulness as a 
strong source of protecting certain civil liberties beyond the 
24. Cf. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990)(sustaining a private suit 
for declaratory and injunctive relief that public schools receiving federal assistance and 
permitting a "noncurriculum related student group" to use school facilities may not 
exclude any other group, including religious activity groups). 
25. See Board ofEduc. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)(holding that state "lending" of 
publicly purchased school textbooks for use in parochial schools is not a forbidden 
fiscal subsidy in aid of religion under the Fourteenth Amendment). But see Wolman v. 
Walter, 433 U.S 229 (1977)(distinguishing Allen and holding that seemingly indistin-
guishable state lending of publicly purchased projectors, tape recorders, record play-
ers, maps and globes, or science kits is a forbidden subsidy). 
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protection furnished by the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Bill of Rights. And I want to return to state constitutions in 
order to raise a question respecting their possible usefulness as 
a means of circumscribing the efforts or efficacy of congres-
sional schemes of this kind. Namely, I will question whether a 
state constitution may forbid a state to engage in any conduct 
that would abridge the rights guaranteed to each citizen or per-
son in the state. If so, that gives state constitutions a usefulness 
related to the kinds of programs (with strings attached) we have 
just now reviewed. What might that usefulness be? 
III. 
Consider the following opinion issued by the Supreme Court 
of State X interpreting and applying Article N of the state con-
stitution, an article addressed to the right of the people to be 
free of police or prosecutorial practices involving no Fourth 
Amendment violation, but nonetheless involving "trickery and 
deceit" by prosecutors and by police. The opinion reads quite 
straightfonvardly in just the following way: 
In the framing of the bill of rights of this state, duplicity by government 
in law enforcement was expressly addressed-and expressly forbidden. 
And the courts of the state were expressly forbidden (by Section 2 of Article 
N) to permit any prosecution to proceed upon admission or proof that the 
prosecution had in any manner been party to, or benefited from, police or 
prosecutorial activity violative of Section 1. These provisions in this 
state~ bill of rights are well known, they are unequivocal, and they have 
been part of this state's fundamental law from the beginning. 26 
Every provision in the state constitution's bill of rights constitutes a 
specific disempowerment of the legislature. The very purpose of a Bill of 
Rights, even as justice Robert jackson noted, is to disempower majorities 
from being able to act on behalf of one kind of preference over another, 
(for example, a greater preference for tranquility than for free speech). 27 
The purpose of a bill of rights, in short, is to disallow democratic majori-
26. That no other state may have a provision of the same rigor is merely interesting. That the 
Fourteenth Amendment may contain no such provision is merely interesting as well. That much may 
be true on any other matter; for example, the extent to which Article Min the bill of rights of this state 
guarantees a breadth of freedom of speech and of the press is also more generous than is reported in the 
Fourteenth Amendment or in the free speech clause of any other state constitution of our sister states. 
That other states differ, or that the Fourteenth Amendment differs, is simply confirming evidence of 
federalism and of its vitality even today [footnote by the Court]. 
27. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)("The very purpose of 
a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy .... 
Ones right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, 
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tarianism its ordinary due, by disabling the legislature from acting in a 
particular way with regard to a particular matter. If one means to grant 
back to the legislature some power to strike its own balance, presumably a 
balance reflecting majority will, it can be done. But so doing requires that 
one meet the rigor of the amendment process itself as the condition of 
bringing that result about. In the meantime, the constitution controls the 
legislature, rather than the other way round. 
In the case now before us, the legislature may be assumed to have con-
cluded that the practical imperatives of fighting crime have rendered obso-
lete such assumptions as the legislature thinks must have been entertained 
at the time Article N was made part of this state's bill of rights. In this 
instance, too, others may suppose that at least if those of us holding office 
in the judiciary agree with the legislature in that respect, then, agreeing 
with the legislature, we will deem the bar on the use of evidence acquired 
by trickery and deceit as inapplicable. Wrong again. It is the tendency of 
every age to find itself a different age. It is the tendency of every age, that 
is, to impute to an earlier age some set of errant assumptions or, if not 
errant originally, at least assumptions today 's circumstances have made 
utterly obsolete. Of such reasoning is the death of constitutional guaran-
tees. So, here, we are invited to "reason" about the no-trickery-or-deceit 
clause in Article N, that is, to assume that when it was enacted, it was 
enacted on a belief that its enactment would not be inconsistent with some 
minimally effective capacity to fight crime-that those acting on this as-
sumption would themselves indeed not want it applied in circumstances 
like those faced "today "-and so, even in keeping with their own ( al-
leged) understanding, we should accordingly hold the guarantee inappli-
cable under circumstances where its ·own authors presumably never meant 
to put the society at such terrible risk. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has sometimes itself adopted 
just this position. But we shall not. Our view is that the bill of rights of 
this state is amendable by suitable statewide majorities. Until it is altered, 
however, the courts of this state should not do less than apply it now even 
as it was applied in the past. If the cost of maintaining Article N is felt to 
be "too high" (a matter with which we do not think it is any of our 
business to agree or disagree), still the constitutional requirement is that 
that point of view must itself carry the requisite sentiment necessary to 
produce an amendment to the clause-an amendment changing the 
clause, so as to be effective in court. Until Article N is repealed or altered 
in some way, the courts of this state will not do less than apply it now, as 
and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote: they depmd 011 the outcome of 110 elec-
tions. ") [footnote by the Court]. 
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always, straightforwardly and according to its own unequivocal tenns 
This opinion seems to have been issued in response to some 
kind of legislative act. We are not told enough to know just 
what was in this law. But we know enough to understand what 
it must have been about, because we know that it was deemed 
to be forbidden to the legislature given the court's understand-
ing of Article N. What is equally clear is that had that act been 
conceded to be within the proper authority of the state legisla-
ture, presumably it would not have been struck down. The 
court treats Article N as a "specific disempowerment of the leg-
islature." It speaks also of Article N as "disabling" the legisla-
ture of authority to treat the constitutional right of the people 
to be free of police trickery and deceit as an expendable free-
dom, that is, as something within the authority of the legisla-
ture to trade away whether because the state legislature itself 
places no great value on this right or because it feels itself con-
fronted with a hard choice. It says, rather, that Article N forbids 
any action by the state which would abrogate the guarantees of 
Article N. 
Of course, in all of these ways the opinion is still pretty ordi-
nary. One might suppose it is simply a stock opinion (with a few 
rhetorical flourishes) invalidating a state law that presumed to 
authorize police trickery and deceit and make all evidence ac-
quired by such means admissible in state court. And, to be 
sure, an opinion of this kind might be addressed to such a law. 
But it might also be addressed to this kind oflaw: a law adopted 
by the state authorizing the state or some agency or subdivision 
of the state to qualify for $5 million assistance under an act of 
Congress providing that "the police in any state receiving a 
grant are to engage in all law enforcement strategies as man-
dated by the disbursing agency from whom the state receives 
its grant" and further providing that "the state courts of any 
federally assisted state shall admit such evidence as may be de-
scribed as admissible evidence in federally prescribed guide-
lines issued by the X federal agency acting under the authority 
of this act." The preceding opinion of the state supreme court, 
that is, could have been issued as a declaratory judgment upon 
submission of an original question presented on petition of the 
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state attorney general28 seeking a determination of the follow-
ing question: whether anything in the state constitution precludes the 
state from participating in this federally sponsored program? And the 
court's answer, fully reflected in the opinion we have just been 
reading, is "yes," that its participation is precluded-it is pre-
cluded as a matter of state constitutional law. Its holding is that 
if it is true (as, here, it is true) that the right of the people guar-
anteed by Article N would be compromised by the state's par-
ticipation in the federal program, then the state's participation 
is foreclosed as a matter of state constitutional law. The attor-
ney general's inquiry was entirely timely and proper. Equally so 
is the state supreme court's response. Its view is that the state 
may make no law permitting or authorizing any participation in 
any program operated under standards prejudicial to any right 
provided by Article N. 
The essence of the court's opinion is in its utterly unremark-
able application of Article N as a limit forbidding the state to 
act in any manner subverting Article N rights. That some or 
that many in the legislature are eager to sign the state up (in-
deed, that some are eager to do so because in their view it 
would at once make the state better in two ways off than it is 
currently29), gives them no leverage on that account to pro-
ceed. The court rightly reads Article N as blocking their de-
signs. That other states are not similarly constrained by any 
similarly strong "anti-trickery-or-deceit police practice" guar-
antee in their own constitutions may be true. But that, as the 
court observed, makes no difference at all. The state constitu-
tional rights of citizens in different states differ. Here, the court 
took care simply to address only those rights guaranteed in the 
fundamental law of this state, leaving the courts of each other 
state to speak to the condition of constitutional rights in their 
own. 
The textbook loan case, reprised in just the same fashion, is 
analytically identical. At step one, it merely concerns a state 
constitutional Bill of Rights clause framed somewhat more 
28. See, e.g., Opinion of the justices, 372 Mass. 874 (1977)(discussing in an advisory 
opinion the constitutionality of state legislation mandating teachers in public school to 
lead daily recitation of Pledge of Allegiance). 
29. First, because the state will get $5 million to spend it wouldn't othenvise get to 
spend (so, "better off" in this way); and second, because its police and prosecutors, 
once liberated from the restrictions of Article N, will be able more effectively to fight 
crime (so the people will also be "better off" in this way as well). 
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sweepingly than the Supreme Court has been willing to con-
strue from the First or the Fourteenth Amendment. It is a state 
constitutional clause that more stolidly enacted James 
Madison's view that even the appropriation of "three pence" of 
money people involuntarily are made to pay in state or in local 
taxes in support of any religious establishment is an impermis-
sible use of their funds.30 Many state constitutions have such a 
provision, as we already have twice noticed.31 The U.S. 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that there are such clauses, 
and state supreme courts have in some measure enforced 
them-to disallow some "church-state" arrangements (subsi-
dies) not otherwise disallowed by the First or Fourteenth 
Amendments as construed by a majority in the Supreme 
Court. 32 Where the terms of a proffered federal program would 
submit a participating state to a federal regulation requiring 
that state to devote some fraction of its tax monies to "assist" a 
religious establishment, then the program is one in which par-
ticipation by this state is precluded by a restriction disabling it 
from participation on these particular terms. 
In the setting of the discussion we have been holding, the 
"federalism effect" of such a (Blaine Amendment-type) clause 
in the state constitution should merely be the same as in our 
understanding of the federalism effect of the Article N clause in 
the preceding case: the clause disables any state agency from 
participating in any federal program that grants authority to 
any federal agency to require any participating school board 
providing any free textbooks acquired with the aid of state or 
local taxes to supply them equally to any nonprofit schools, in-
cluding parochial schools requesting their free loan for the use-
ful life of such books. The state constitutional provision (that 
is, the "Blaine Amendment" in its Constitution) forecloses the 
availability of this program to the school districts of this state. 
No doubt the preceding example is jarring.33 Here is a clos-
ing example, however, to try to make one interested in investi-
gating this subject a bit more. Suppose, as is true in California, 
30. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 40, 41, 45, 47 (1947)(Rutledge, J., 
dissenting for himself, Jackson, Frankfurter, and Burton,lJ.)(quoting from Madison's 
Memorial and Remonstrance, which is reprinted in full as an Appendix, id. at 63-72). 
31. See supra nn.5, 6. 
32. !d. 
33. As it is meant to be, all the better to show what unexpected kinds of provisions 
one may find in a state constitution and its bill of rights, and why one might care about 
such matters more than one has been inclined to do. 
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the state supreme court has interpreted and applied the "pri-
vacy" rights clause in the state constitution to hold that it is a 
denial of equal protection for a public health facility to offer 
outpatient services generally, but deny any abortion service at 
all. So, in this way, the state constitution has been construed not 
to leave women dependent solely on private clinics (as the U.S. 
Supreme Court has ruled a state may do insofar as the Four-
teenth Amendment is concemed).34 Now, following up on this 
U.S. Supreme Court ruling-that states need not permit non-
emergency abortions to be performed in public health facili-
ties-suppose that a majority in Congress were strongly of the 
same view as the legislatures of those states that do not permit 
nontherapeutic abortions in any public health facility. Were 
Congress strongly of this view, it might well want to carry that 
view into effect not merely in regard to any federal health facil-
ity subject to its control but, quite naturally, in regard to any 
state health facility also within its means to influence decisively 
injust the same way. 
Were Congress in fact of this disposition, it might very well 
provide two statutory changes. The first would provide that "in 
no federal health facility shall any nontherapeutic abortion be 
provided"; and the second would provide similarly, that "in no 
state or local health facility receiving funds under any program 
administered by the Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices shall any nontherapeutic abortion be provided. "35 May 
not a class action be suitably brought in state court so to secure 
an appropriate declaratory judgment that in this circumstance, 
the state's public health facilities are foreclosed from taking any 
HHS assistance as long as this restriction continues to apply to 
any such facility receiving such assistance? I can think of no 
good reason for questioning the validity or merit of such a suit 
as this. It stands on the same excellent footing as our original 
case reviewing and applying Article N. And it should produce 
the same result. 
To date, I am unaware of any such suits like those discussed 
34. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989). Compare Com· 
mittee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 626 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981) with Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 197 (1980). 
35. Cf Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (199l)(sustaining a broad restriction of this 
sort, disallowing any reference to abortion in furnishing advice in a "family planning" 
Title X project financed in whole or in part with federal dollars, and forbidding any 
inclusion of any agency providing such a service in a Title X project's list of referral 
agencies). 
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above having been brought in any state court, 36 just as I am 
unaware of any state governor or attorney general intervening 
in the manner I suggest their own oaths of office (to act consist-
ently with the state's constitution, when so acting would not 
violate any superior obligation to act consistently with the na-
tional constitution) would require. But I believe the reason 
goes not to any obvious infirmity in the theory, but simply to 
the possibility that the theory has not been seriously consid-
ered or tried out. To be sure, there may be some fatal flaw in it, 
but if so, it is not obvious. Moreover, if such a theory is sound, 
it would have interesting implications beyond the matters we 
have already noted in the random examples selected here just 
to try it out. 
IV. 
The national spending power with strings attached, it has 
been observed, evidently puts federalism under the discretion 
of Congress in the form of the usual newer way these things are 
done,37 instructed that it should feel free to do so by the 
Supreme Court itself. 38 Congress sets the terms of its offers 
36. Though no such case yet exists, the Supreme Court of Oregon has recognized 
the relevance of such a suit and has virtually assumed that the suit would be appropri-
ate. See Salem College & Academy, Inc. v. Employment Division, 695 P.2d 25, 30, 34 
(Or. 1985)("[A] legislature cannot violate the state's constitution in order to qualify for 
a benefit that Congress leaves optional .... [T]he state cannot violate its own constitu-
tion in order to satisfy a federal program that Congress has not made obligatory under 
the Supremacy Clause."). 
37. Writing for the Op-Ed page of the New York Times, John Perry Barlow, lyricist 
for the Grateful Dead, has recently republished The Bill of Rights as "revised by the 
state and Federal judiciary," catching the point quite perfectly. His restatement of the 
Tenth Amendment is deadly. According to lyricist Barlow, this is our Tenth Amend-
ment (courtesy of the U.S. Supreme Court): "The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution are reserved to the Departments of Justice and Treasury, 
except when the states are willing to forsake Federal financing." John Perry Barlow, Bill 
O'Rights Lite, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1993, at A23. 
38. See supra note 37 and cases and critical law journal discussions, supra nn.l6-17. 
Ironically, the opportunity for congressional exploitation of the power to spend-with-
strings-attached was provided by Juslice Roberts's dicta for the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I (1936). Rejecting Madison's interpretation that the 
power to "lay and collect Taxes ... to pay the Debt~ and provide for the common 
Defence and general Welfare of the United States" amounted, in the latter clause, "to 
no more than a reference to the other powers enumerated in the subsequent clauses of 
the same section," the Court sided with the view that the clause empowers Congress to 
levy taxes in contemplation of sustaining a more general spending power (that is, to 
spend for any purpose Congress might deem consistent with the general welfare as 
such). Thus construed, the power then proved to be strong enough to brush aside 
what, until then, had been regarded as a limiting principle applicable to the clause: that 
"what Congress cannot do directly (because given no authority to do it), neither can it 
presume to do indirectly (for example, by manipulating the terms of its largesse to 
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quite knowingly-at just the "right" level-to make them "irre-
sistible" and, accordingly, no state tends very long to resist.39 
Historically, social liberals overall have applauded this develop-
ment, generally seeing no great danger to things they may most 
care about ("personal rights" and certainly not "state rights"), 
and much preferring what they see as the progressivism so long 
associated with Congress and hardly at all with the states. 
Even so, such an attitude ought not make one wholly hostile 
to this brief review. There is more than a single value in feder-
alism, as Justice Brandeis noted quite a long time ago.40 The 
quality of difference from one state to another is not always 
strained. Just because the prevailing constitutional perspective 
of what it means to have a certain kind of right in a given state 
may not be of a piece with the prevailing perspective elsewhere, 
it frankly provides no support for the manner in which Con-
gress routinely hunts about for ways and means to flatten 
things out. Experimentalism at the edges of civil liberties is 
secure regulatory outcomes it was given no constitutional authority to try to achieve), 
The "answer" to the objection was that what Congress might indeed not have been 
authorized to do under any other power, still it may proceed to do under this clause 
instead. Moreover, if it is up to Congress to determine whether one's interest in partici-
pating in federal expenditures is or is not consistent with "the general welfare" (as the 
Court was subsequently to suggest), then one's complaint, insofar as one might be 
deemed ineligible, is principally just with Congress; it is not a complaint to bring into 
the courts. To be sure, the latter proposition was not itself embraced by Butler, which 
actually held the form of spending-with-strings-attached was void under the Tenth 
Amendment. Nevertheless, subsequent decisions have upheld it. See, e.g., South Dakota 
v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 n.2 (1987)(citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 90-91 (1976), 
for the proposition that "[t]he level of (judicial] deference to the congressional deci-
sion is such that the Court has more recently [since Butler] questioned whether "gen-
eral welfare" is a judicially enforceable restriction at all."). 
There was in fact nothing in the dicta of Butler or any other case that need have led to 
the Court's virtual abrogation of federalism review under the "spending clause" any 
more than the meager dicta used to abandon federalism review under the "commerce 
clause." Cf. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 302 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)(Cardozo, 
].)(stating that a tax in not valid "when imposed by act of Congress, if it is laid upon the 
condition that a state may escape its operation through the adoption of a statute unre-
lated in subject matter to activities fairly within the scope of national policy and 
power."); see also William W. Van Alstyne, Federalism, Congress, The States and The Tmth 
Amendment: Adrift in The Cellophane Sea, 1987 DUKE LJ. 769. 
39. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)(finding that unless a state 
legislature discriminates against its own eighteen-to-twenty-one year old adults by 
criminalizing alcoholic beverages for them though for no one else in its adult-age pop-
ulation, the state will be deemed to be less suitable than other states as a recipient of 
federal highway assistance funds paid from national taxes (albeit taxes to which its own 
residents have contributed in the same measure as the residents of the other states), 
sustained, per opinion by Rehnquist, CJ., with but two dissents.) 
40. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (Brandeis, J., dissent· 
ing)("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory .... "). 
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even now not an obsolete notion in this country. Differences in 
the cultures of America are not an altogether undesirable 
thing. Where federal constitutional rights tend to fail us, more-
over, perhaps it may be useful to consider this subject at least 
one time again. 
For example, no state constitution that I am aware of has 
even now been applied to forbid the state from requiring peo-
ple to register by race. As yet, no state constitution exists that 
even protects one from being made an unwilling party under 
law to racial schemes or to racial plans others may propose, 
requiring one to register others by race and submit them to 
discrimination by race at one's own hands. Since there is not 
now any state whose constitution is construed in this way, we 
are left at the rusting hinge of this century and of this millen-
nium without a single example in this country of a truly color-
blind constitution.41 Professionally, I regret that this is the 
case. I believe we might all learn a great deal from the example 
of such a state. Perhaps this state would not long endure. Still, 
it is an experiment in federalism one might, finally, want at 
least someone to try. 
If the thesis ventured in this brief essay were followed, more-
over, in any such state as I have envisioned it here, and there 
existed federal programs that offered money or other assist-
ance to other states on the now-ordinary condition that they-
_these other states, their agencies, their businesses, their col-
leges, schools, highway agencies-should engage in such racial 
registering, racial indexing, racial ordering, and racial discrimi-
nation as the program required, then it would be routine to 
expect that participation in such programs would not be an op-
tion in this state. For in any such state, under no circumstances 
41. Some state judges have tried to have their own state constitutions understood in 
this way, even as some Supreme Court justices sought to do so during their tenure on 
the Supreme Court. See DeRonde v. Regents ofUniv. of California, 625 P.2d 220, 229 
(Cal. 1981)(Mosk, ]., dissenting); Price v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of Sacramento County, 
604 P.2d 1365, 1383 (Cal. 1980)(Mosk, J., dissenting); see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 
448 U.S. 448, 522, 532 (1980)(Stewart,J., dissenting); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 
312, 320, 343-44 (1974)(Douglas, J., dissenting); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 
559-60 (1896}(Harlan, j., dissenting). See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MoRALITY 
OF CONSENT {1975); TERRY EASTLAND & WILLIAM j. BENNETT, COUNTING BY RAcE: 
EQ.UALITY FROM THE FOUNDING FATHERS TO BAKKE AND WEBER (1979); ANDREW KULL, 
THE CoLORBLIND CoNSTITUTION (1992); THOMAS SowELL, DISCRIMINATION, AFFIRMA-
TIVE ACTION, AND EQ.UAL OPPORTUNITY (1982); SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OuR 
CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN AMERICA (1990); j. HARVEY WILKINSON, FROM 
BROWN TO BAKKE (1979); William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, 
and the Constitution, 46 CHI. L. REv. 775 (1979). 
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could the state "consent" to any such terms or conditions as 
these. Some might regard this with regret. But others might 
not be similarly inclined. Somewhere within the possibilities of 
federalism itself, such a place might still someday be found. 
A BRIEF POSTSCRIPT NOTE ON THE MECHANICS OF ENFORCING 
STATE CoNSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
In examining the manner in which Congress exercises its 
"spending power," one may notice that Congress generally 
elects between two quite different techniques. The first is to 
disqualify a state (or its political subdivisions or agencies} from 
participation unless the state itself makes some alteration in its 
own laws and thereafter maintains its laws as may be required 
to maintain its eligibility. The second does not require such a 
change, but rather provides that where the state (or state subdi-
vision) applies for federal assistance of a certain kind, a rule 
supplied by Congress or by some agency acting under its direc-
tion then becomes substantively applicable to the operations of 
that agency or subdivision simply as a matter of federal law. 
South Dakota v. Dole42 is an example of the first sort. Board of 
Education v. Mergens 43 is an example of the second sort. In Dole, 
Congress had reduced highway financing assistance to states 
that did not raise the lawful minimum drinking age from eight-
een to twenty-one. In Mergens-type situations, on the other 
hand, the state is not required to adopt any new or different 
substantive law. Rather, a school system that receives federal 
assistance is simply prohibited-by federal law-from barring 
any voluntary student group from using school facilities in off 
hours, assuming only that it (the school) otherwise permits any 
such group the use of school premises. So, in all Mergens-type 
cases, the subordinating applicable federal rule overriding any 
contrary local rule simply comes along with the money, that is, 
it is made applicable and controlling as a function of the ac-
ceptance or receipt of the federal funds. In the first kind of 
case, it is the state law enacted by the state legislature that op-
erates as the immediate new and sole source of legal restric-
tion, albeit a state law that (by hypothesis) may well be one the 
state legislature did not approve but adopted to avert the con-
42. 483 u.s. 203 (1987). 
43. 496 u.s. 226 (1990). 
No. 2] "Thirty Pieces of Silver" for the Rights of Your People 323 
gressional threat. In the second kind of case, there is no state 
law that operates as the source of the legal regime-it is the 
federal rule made applicable because of the presence of the 
federal funds. 
Now, suppose that in South Dakota, the state constitution it-
self had previously been amended so to establish the age of 
eighteen as the general age of adulthood.44 And suppose, too, 
that the state constitution has a "strong" equal protection 
clause.45 Suppose the South Dakota legislature, despite these 
provisions, yields to the federal scheme and enacts a general 
criminal prohibition on any adult possessing or consuming any 
alcoholic beverage unless he or she is at least twenty-one years 
of age. In this instance, bringing the matter to a quick resolu-
tion is simple. Assuming the state law would be deemed not to 
comply with the equal protection clause of the state constitu-
tion,46 it cannot matter that, once the state supreme court so 
decides, it may adversely affect the state's eligibility for the 
same measure of federal highway assistance as other states, that 
have no similarly robust equal protection clause, may receive. 
It may not be unconstitutional for Congress to condition its 
highway funding program as it has presumed to do. But that is 
without consequence so far as the equal protection rights of 
South Dakota residents (not to be discriminated against by 
their own legislature in setting the drinking age) are con-
cerned. Presumably a mere retail dispenser of beer may have 
suitable standing to seek a declaratory judgment, invoking the 
state equal protection claim of appropriate eighteen-to-twenty-
one year old customers.47 The case is easy. The manner in 
which the state constitution can be successfully invoked is 
straightforward. But the case is also atypical. Most of the coer-
44. E.g., a change it made around the time the Twenty-Sixth Amendment was rati-
fied (extending the same right to vote to those eighteen-and-over as was previously 
available to those twenty-one-and over). So, the state constitution was also amended at 
the same time in a more general way as well-fixing eighteen as a constitutional defini-
tion of "adulthood" for all age-related equal protection claims under the law. 
45. Construed in light of the amendment (defining "adults" as all persons eighteen 
and over), the state's equal protection clause thus will be read generally to disallow 
legislative bodies to reserve any general civil liberty, right, or privilege solely to per-
sons twenty-one or older. The two constitutional clauses thus operate to protect young 
adults from being treated as a class as in any way less "mature" or less "capable" than 
others simply because they are not as old as others-the state constitution establishes 
their "adulthood" for general purposes of the law. 
46. The case would be reasoned according to n.44 supra. 
47. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
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cive spending-with-strings-attached acts of Congress do not 
work in this way. What then of the other-the more usual-
kind? 
In the Mergens setting, the case is more complicated to be 
sure. For in this setting, there is no obvious state law for an 
objecting party to attack. There is no state law that says any-
thing about religious groups being privileged to conduct reli-
gious voluntary exercises on public school premises (a rule that 
would be subject to challenge, by hypothesis, under the state 
constitutional "no establishment" clause). Rather, it is simply a 
federal rule that does so-a rule at once applicable and binding 
on the school authorities insofar as they do participate in the 
federal funding program itself. Nevertheless, the applicability 
of state constitutional law remains unaltered. The difference is 
simply in the nature of the remedy required in the case. Here 
the case is more like the one first posed in the essay on Article 
N, and virtually like the one on lending publicly-purchased 
schoolbooks to parochial schools. 
If the state constitution had a "no establishment" clause of 
the extended "Blaine Amendment" sort, assuming only that 
that clause is not itself validly subject to objection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment,48 though it would be harder to find a 
suitable entry into the problem, the clause might still appropri-
ately be brought to bear. The clause forbids the state to act in 
any way inconsistent with its guarantee that no taxpayer's co-
erced taxes shall be utilized to subsidize an establishment of 
religion. And, accordingly, the state may not act contrary to 
that guarantee. Where, then, does the proper responsibility lie 
to see that it will not act contrary to that guarantee? 
At one level, there is a useful comparison to be made in these 
matters with a more familiar understanding we already have in 
our constitutional law. It is familiar constitutional law that, 
whatever kind of treaty the United States may make with a for-
eign nation, no provision in any treaty inconsistent with the Bill 
of Rights is enforceable in any state court or federal court of 
the United States. The treaty power, in short, is bounded by 
the Bill of Rights.49 What is interesting in this comparison is 
48. Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 
(1978). 
49. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)(holding that the Sixth Amendment 
precludes applying provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice extending court-
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just this, however. The familiar understanding we have noted 
regarding the limitation on the treaty power is controlling in 
our domestic courts. Only they, and not other courts, are 
bound to enforce no law-including the law of a treaty-incon-
sistent with our Bill of Rights. In theory, and perhaps in prac-
tice, the fact that the United States thus proves to have been 
unable to discharge its treaty obligation (because, bound by the 
Bill of Rights, its national courts may not permit that obligation 
to be fulfilled in fact) may not by itself relieve the United States 
of liability in an international court insofar as it is in breach of 
whatever was the obligation it assumed pursuant to the treaty it 
made. That other court-an international court-need not 
deem the United States excused by the failure of its courts to 
give the treaty full effect (unless the treaty itself so provided). 
And, indeed, the international court may be quite right in this 
position from its point of view. The distinction, however, is also 
obvious as well. In the case we are now discussing, even given 
that the United States may be liable in some measure to the 
other treaty power in an international court, that liability does 
nothing as such to work any violation of any U.S. citizen's per-
sonal constitutional right. Neither the international court nor 
any domestic court will act to deny the domestic constitutional 
right of any person in the United States. 
In our case, the equivalent to the treaty provision is the sub-
stantive federal rule superimposed on the federal funds-a rule 
that is apparently binding (under article VI) if the state takes 
the funds subject to the rule, requiring the state judge (under 
article VI) then to ignore the state constitutional rights the 
state had guaranteed to its own citizens. Vindication of those 
constitutional rights can best be secured by timely action so to 
prevent the state from entering into the program-to prevent it 
from entering into a "treaty" as it were, whose "superior" law 
would then announce itself as controlling even in the state's 
own courts. The best remedy in this circumstances is to seek an 
opinion from the state attorney general (and perhaps from a 
suitable state court) that the proposed terms of the federal pro-
gram (that is, the terms provided by Congress) may be within 
Congress's power to propose, but, however that may be, not 
within the power of the state to accept. If, as may well be the 
martial jurisdiction to overseas civilian wife accused of homicide of service personnel 
spouse). 
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case, the terms are nonnegotiable and nonwaivable so far as 
Congress is concerned, then so be it. That merely means that 
this state cannot, consistent with its own constitution, partici-
pate in the federal scheme. And that seems to me to be not the 
least bit peculiar; rather, merely sound and quite right. 50 
50. Still, it will be obvious that the rules regarding standing, ripeness, etc., under the 
constitution, state statutes, and practices of the fifty states, and the procedures for se· 
curing advisory opinions, class actions, taxpayer suits, or declaratory judgments defy a 
uniformity of description enabling one to manage much more than we have already 
reviewed here in a preliminary way. A more workmanlike examination of these (impor· 
tant) details remains to be done. 
